An unexpected contact on the professional network. An offer of employment from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, based in China. The opportunity to make around £20,000 on the side writing a handful of political reports for a firm from China peppered with confidential or “insider” information. Compensation in digital currency or physical money favored.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that an element about this method would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to use headhunters to try it – prompting the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Approaches on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 the agency's director said operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, seeking political, industrial, military and technological secrets. But a fresh initiative targeting elected officials and Westminster has prompted the intelligence service to take further action.
An espionage alert was distributed on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to reach out to MPs, peers, their assistants, economists, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legal Changes
In the typical manner of UK security services, there was no official release of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. But the agency was aware its briefing note would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the media helps the wider public better identify communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out more information from within Westminster, though that is not the agency's main objective. The service aims for people in public life to understand that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the recent actions occur after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been accused of spying for the foreign power – a charge they rejected – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and Beijing's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has since been updated, and the MI5 slide contains a note of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity face significant criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a criminal offense if a person participates in conduct that could potentially “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, though, is what China has to achieve. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited access of classified material, and an associate of theirs even less. Yet Beijing is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by MPs.
Methodological Variations and Ongoing Cyber Threats
In part there are distinct approaches too. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's export intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is vast, employing three hundred thousand people. A former US official, a US national cyber director under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers involved in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have struggled to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for which details is deemed to be of value,” the minister responsible Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on this week, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may result in someone quickly peripheral turning significant.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the Western nations at a level below the point of direct conflict. China has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the another operation breach of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in relentless efforts to identify covert sources on UK politics online because it seeks to be provocative, to display influence and because it can.